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Protecting Against International Infringements in the 
Digital Age Using United States Copyright Law: A 
Critical Analysis of the Current State of the Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the Internet and its exploding use in the past 
few years, intellectual property protections have advanced to the 
forefront of conversation, litigation, and legislation as governments, 
businesses, and consumers strive to protect intellectual property 
while maintaining the independence of the end user in this new 
technological revolution. Of particular concern is the freedom and 
mobility the Internet has brought to software producers, consumers, 
and software piraters. Intellectual property protections that tradition-
ally afforded adequate protection prior to the Internet revolution 
may, in some circumstances, inadequately protect certain types of in-
tellectual property.1 Software is of particular concern; by its nature 
software is easily copied without affecting the original or altering the 
software’s functionality. 
Copyright law, by its territorial nature, does not adequately pro-
tect copyright owners’ interests in an international context.2 An indi-
vidual who has been afforded a certain degree of copyright protec-
tion in the United States is not guaranteed protection against 
copyright infringements that may occur abroad, even though the 
copyright holder and the copyright infringer are U.S. citizens.3 Cer-
tain doctrines like contributory infringement and vicarious liability 
serve to deter extraterritorial would-be copyright infringers. Due to 
territorial limitations on U.S. law, however, these doctrines fall woe-
fully short because U.S. courts cannot exercise subject matter juris-
diction over wholly foreign infringements, even though the in-
fringement may be perpetrated by a U.S. entity.4 The territorial 
limitation on copyright restricts a court’s ability to find subject mat-
 
 1. See, e.g., infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See infra Parts III–IV. The courts have come to different conclusions regarding this 
principle with respect to the “to authorize” language of 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001). 
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ter jurisdiction, although a court may easily exercise personal juris-
diction.5 Some courts have attempted to combat the subject matter 
jurisdiction question by finding that mere “authorization” in the 
United States of an extraterritorial infringing act constitutes action-
able infringement,6 while other courts have maintained that “au-
thorization” will not extend the application of copyright law to 
wholly foreign infringements.7 One court explained the “authoriza-
tion” problem this way: “Under [the current] view, a phone call to 
Nebraska results in liability; the same phone call to France results in 
riches. In a global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a 
difference.”8 In short, depending on a court’s interpretation, the 
court may choose to interpret expansively subject matter based on 
copyright law to extend to extraterritorial infringements, or the court 
may seek to limit copyright subject matter’s application by requiring 
a territorial copyright violation. The question is which view better 
purports to promote the copyright policies outlined by the legislative 
branch. 
This Comment seeks to address the problem of protecting copy-
righted works from infringements occurring abroad. Currently, cer-
tain mechanisms exist to extend copyright protection to extraterrito-
rial infringing acts, but those protective extensions of copyright law 
are limited in scope and rarely avail the copyright owner adequate le-
gal protection in foreign jurisdictions. An expansive treatment of 
copyright law, as opposed to restricting copyright’s extraterritorial 
application, can ensure that the copyright holder may litigate his 
claim domestically under U.S. copyright law. Litigating in the 
United States will reduce the cost of copyright enforcement, ensure a 
better incentive for the creation of copyrighted works, add certainty 
to the law, and protect the United States’ investment in its intellec-
tual property. 
Part II provides a background to the problem and defines the ex-
traterritorial enforcement problem, including identifying copyright 
law’s territorial limitations and the effect of those limitations on pre-
venting copyright infringements abroad. This section also explores a 
limited number of situations where infringements abroad may be ac-
 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 7. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 8. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). 
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tionable under U.S. law. Part III investigates the dichotomy between 
recent court cases and the respective courts’ interpretations of the 
copyright statute to infringements authorized domestically but oc-
curring abroad. Part IV outlines the current state of copyright law 
with respect to application of foreign law to the extraterritorial in-
fringements in both U.S. and foreign courts. This paper concludes 
by suggesting that, due to the Internet revolution and the ease of 
copying protected works, U.S. courts should interpret copyright ex-
pansively to afford a greater amount of protection to the copyrights 
of U.S. nationals. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Copyright law provides certain monopolistic protections based 
on the nature of the underlying work. The protections provided by 
copyright differ fundamentally from intellectual property safeguards 
in patent law, offering protection for copyrightable “expression,” not 
“ideas;”9 however, in spite of the fundamental differences in protec-
tion offered by the two areas of law, courts have looked for assistance 
in patent law when determining how to apply copyright law in un-
charted territory.10 As with patent law, copyright law does not extend 
to most extraterritorial infringing acts; the law restricts actionable 
copyright infringements to domestic violations.11 This extraterritorial 
restriction affects the ability of U.S. nationals to enforce their copy-
right “rights” against other entities that may extraterritorially in-
fringe the copyright holders’ works, especially where the United 
States has an interest in protecting its citizens’ intellectual property. 
Supplemental doctrines of vicarious liability and contributory in-
fringement serve to extend copyright law’s territorial bounds. 
A. Extraterritorial Application of Copyright Law 
Courts deciding copyright infringement cases have looked not 
only to copyright law to solve infringement questions but also to 
patent law because of the similarities between the two.12 
Understanding extraterritorial application of copyright law also 
 
 9. See, e.g., infra Part II.A. 
 10. See, e.g., infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.A; see also infra Part III (explaining particular doctrines and situa-
tions where the courts have found that exercising subject matter jurisdiction over certain for-
eign copyright infringements is within the “territorial” restrictions placed on copyright). 
 12. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (stat-
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standing extraterritorial application of copyright law also requires 
some understanding of the extraterritorial application of patent law. 
Patent law protects ideas “reduc[ed] to practice,”13 not expression 
fixed in a “tangible medium,”14 so the net protections afforded to 
the two types of intellectual property differ in scope, and the restric-
tion on patent is limited to concrete applications of ideas; copyright 
law protects expressions, not ideas. 
The territorial scope of patent and copyright are similar in that 
the territorial limitations on the two areas of law are premised on the 
same principle that laws passed by Congress are limited to the terri-
torial boundaries of the United States, unless otherwise provided by 
statute or in congressional intent.15 This limitation adversely affects 
copyright owners’ rights when the courts will not recognize subject 
matter jurisdiction over a defendant over whom the court may val-
idly exercise personal jurisdiction. 
The scope of copyright law is restricted to protecting works 
within the territorial limitation of U.S. laws by providing a cause of 
action for domestic infringements of protected works. Copyright law 
reserves a limited number of exclusive rights in copyright for the 
creator of “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression.”16 The exclusive rights listed in section 10617 of 
the Copyright Act do not explicitly restrict the scope of the copy-
 
ing that “[t]he closest analogy [to copyright] is provided by the patent law cases to which it is 
appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”); 
see also id. n.19 (noting that patent and copyright are not completely identical: “The two areas 
of the law, naturally, are not twins, and we exercise the caution which we have expressed in the 
past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other.”). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112 (1994). 
 14. 17 U.S.C § 102 (1994). 
 15. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); infra note 25 and accom-
panying text. 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106 provides the copyright owner the “exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:” 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . 
(2) to prepare derivative works . . . 
(3) to distribute copies . . . 
(4) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly . . . 
(6) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio trans-
mission. 
Id. 
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right monopoly within the territorial limits of the United States.18 
Section 501,19 which outlines a cause of action for copyright in-
fringement, also makes no mention of the territoriality require-
ment.20 
In United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co.,21 the Su-
preme Court held that copyright law does not apply extraterritori-
ally.22 The issue was whether, under the Copyright Act of 1905, the 
notice requirement extended to copies of a published work distrib-
uted abroad.23 Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, indicated 
that copyright law does not extend extraterritorially and stated that 
the “notice is necessary only in ‘all copies of such books sold or dis-
tributed in the United States.’”24 The Supreme Court found that 
Congress had implicitly included territoriality in the statute. Con-
gress has seemingly acquiesced, as it has not legislatively overturned 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in United Dictionary. 
Apart from copyright law, the Supreme Court has more recently 
reemphasized the presumption against extraterritorial extension of 
U.S. law unless the particular statute includes a provision for the 
statute’s extraterritorial application or congressional intent specifi-
cally indicates that the particular law should be applied outside the 
territorial limitations of the United States.25 Although the Supreme 
Court has not recently ruled directly on the issue of extraterritorial 
enforcement of copyright law, many courts have continued to hold 
that U.S. copyright law does not apply extraterritorially.26 Numerous 
 
 18. See id. 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 20. See id. 
 21. 208 U.S. 260 (1908). 
 22. See id. at 264 (holding that copyright does not extend “beyond the jurisdiction 
where that law was in force”). 
 23. See id. at 263–64. Prior to 1976, published copyrighted works required notice to 
perfect the copyright. 
 24. Id. at 264 (quoting Act of March 3, 1905, c. 1432, 33 Stat. 1000 (1905)). 
 25. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that, unless 
specifically outlined in statute or included in congressional intent, laws made by Congress are 
presumed to apply only territorially). In response to the Supreme Court’s holding, Congress 
amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to extend to U.S. citizens working overseas for U.S. 
companies. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C § 2000e(f) (1994)). 
 26. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 
1994) (en banc); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1994); 
FilmVideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981); Ahbez v. Edwin H. Mor-
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commentators have also agreed that copyright law does not apply ex-
traterritorially because the statute does not explicitly provide for ex-
traterritorial application, congressional intent does not specify broad 
application to extraterritorial infringements, courts have traditionally 
limited copyright to territorial application, and international comity 
concerns require abstaining from treading upon other nations’ re-
served rights to govern within their own boundaries.27 This Com-
ment proposes that the territorial restriction on recognizing copy-
right infringements should not hinder the courts from exercising 
subject matter jurisdiction over contributory infringements based on 
wholly extraterritorial infringements where the contributorily infring-
ing party benefiting from the infringement is a U.S. entity over 
which a U.S. court may validly exercise personal jurisdiction. 
B. Extraterritoriality and its Effect on Reverse Engineering Software 
A fundamental difference exists between copyright and patent 
protections with respect to reverse engineering. Reverse engineering 
has been a traditional method for finding out how a particular pat-
ented invention works; a party does not infringe by purchasing a pat-
ented product and then subsequently reverse-engineering the prod-
uct to discover how it functions or what composes the product. 
Once the functionality has been discovered, the party doing the re-
verse engineering can create a compatible or similar product without 
infringing on the patented work. 
Reverse-engineering a piece of software, as opposed to reverse-
engineering a patent, creates problems when a “copy” of the copy-
righted software is made for the reverse engineering process and sub-
sequent analysis. The actual reverse engineering itself does not create 
liability. Rather, making a copy of the software or source code leads 
to liability for copyright infringement.28 The creation of this “copy” 
 
ris & Co., 548 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 27. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (2000). Unlike patent law, copyright law 
does not contain explicit statutory limitations restricting liability to infringing acts occurring 
within territories of the United Stated. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 501, 602 (1994). 
 28. Software, including user interfaces and source code, like other protectable works 
involving copyright law, is only protected to the extent of its original expression. See 17 
U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The user interface is the part of the software program and associated 
devices that allows the person using the software to interact with the software program. The 
interface is composed of a number of devices, including output devices, such as a monitor or 
speakers, and input devices, such as the keyboard, mouse, joystick, microphone, and any other 
device used to provide information from the user to the computer program. Source code is the 
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directly infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive right to “copy” 
under section 106 of the Copyright Act.29 
The Ninth Circuit held in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Alcolade, 
Inc.,30 that “copying necessary for reverse engineering can be a fair 
use when the reverse engineering party has a legitimate reason for 
doing so and when no other means of access to the unprotected 
elements exists.”31 According to the court, if another method exists 
 
form of the computer program written by the computer programmer in a language that the 
programmer understands. The source code is then “compiled” into a machine-readable form, 
which the computer interprets in the computing process. The source code is necessarily com-
prised of “expression” due to the way the particular programmer writes the source code and 
functional elements, which cause the computer/computer program to behave in a particular 
way due to the algorithm created by the programmer. The algorithm and the mathematical 
function it emulates is likely not protectable because the mathematical function is an idea, not 
the protectable expression of an idea. The expression must be in a “tangible medium.” Id. 
Underlying ideas and functional aspects of software code are not protectable, see id.; however, 
attempting to reach and understand the underlying ideas and functional aspects necessarily im-
plicates copying the associated protectable expression, which may likely result in copyright in-
fringement. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that copying software code in whole is de facto copyright infringe-
ment; however, the Court held as fair use the copying of software source code to identify and 
understand the “unprotected functional elements of the program.” Id. at 1514. 
 29. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
 30. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 31. Id. at 1514. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega, Congress, in 1998, passed 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998), which also provides for restrictions on the extent of copying that a party may under-
take for reverse engineering purposes where copyright protection systems restrict access to the 
underlying work—the source code in the case of software. The DMCA’s focus on reverse en-
gineering allows a party to circumvent a copyright protection system in only limited circum-
stances. The House Report on the DMCA indicates that the reverse engineering fair-use provi-
sion explicitly provided by the DMCA is “intended to promote reverse engineering by 
permitting the circumvention of access control technologies for the sole purpose of achieving 
software interoperability.” H.R REP. NO. 105-551 pt. 2, at 42 (1998). The relevant portion of 
the House Report reads: 
Section 102(f) is intended to promote reverse engineering by permitting the cir-
cumvention of access control technologies for the sole purpose of achieving software 
interoperability. Section 102(f)(1) permits the act of circumvention in only certain 
instances. To begin with, the copy of the computer program which is the subject of 
the analysis must be lawfully acquired (i.e., the computer program must be acquired 
from a legitimate source, along with any necessary serial codes, passwords, or other 
such means as may be necessary to be able to use the program as it was designed to 
be used by a consumer of the product). In addition, the acts must be limited to 
those elements of the program which must be analyzed to achieve interoperability of 
an independently created program with other programs. The resulting product must 
also be a new and original work, in that it may not infringe the original computer 
program. Moreover, the objective of the analysis must be to identify and extract 
such elements as are necessary to achieve interoperability which are not otherwise 
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for understanding the unprotected elements of a computer program, 
those methods seemingly must be exhausted before a party may seek 
to lawfully reverse-engineer the software under a fair use defense.32 
The problem of “copying” with respect to reverse-engineering soft-
ware would rarely arise in a “machine” situation where the reverse-
engineering party purchases a patented machine and subsequently 
reverse-engineers the patented article. Copyright law places a restric-
tion on allowing the copying necessary to access and analyze the un-
protectable “ideas” incorporated in the source code of a copyrighted 
software product. Copying, not reverse-engineering, gives rise to 
copyright infringement.33 
 
available to the person. Finally, the goal of this section is to ensure that current law 
is not changed, and not to encourage or permit infringement. Thus, each of the acts 
undertaken must avoid infringing the copyright of the author of the underlying 
computer program. 
Id. 
The DMCA permits reverse engineering only to “a person who has lawfully obtained the 
right to use a copy of a computer program,” but only for overcoming compatibility concerns. 
112 Stat. at 2866. The corollary is that a party engaging in reverse engineering that does not 
obtain the lawful right to use the program or reverse engineers for reasons other than establish-
ing compatibility between computer programs is per se liable for copyright infringement if the 
situation necessitates circumventing the access control technology. The DMCA further restricts 
the scope of reverse engineering to the “sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those ele-
ments of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created 
computer program with other programs.” Id. The DMCA does not restrict the reverse engi-
neering of the target software directly. Instead, the Act restricts reverse engineering indirectly 
by only allowing circumvention of the “copyright protection system” for the sole purpose of 
reverse engineering to achieve “interoperability of an independently created computer pro-
gram.” Id. The DMCA, on its face, appears not to restrict reverse engineering when no “copy-
right protection system” is involved. See id. Thus, the DMCA appears to prohibit the “circum-
vention of copyright protection systems” for any purpose other than reverse engineering for 
purposes of establishing interoperability between programs. Reverse engineering to look at the 
functional aspects of the program for the purpose of creating a competing program would ex-
ceed the permissions granted by the DMCA and would likely constitute a copyright violation. 
See id. 
The provision provided by the DMCA for circumventing “copyright protections sys-
tems” for reverse engineering purposes seems to be particularly narrow in scope. The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Sega does not necessarily condone reverse engineering for the commercial 
purpose of creating a new program that contains competing functionality. See Sega Enters. 
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520–29 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sony Computer 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (elaborating on the rule in 
Sega). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (outlining the “fair use” defense in copyright 
law). 
 32. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520–29 (discussing the validity of a “fair use” claim as ap-
plied to reverse engineering where no other means exists for discovering the functional aspects 
of the software in question). 
 33. A problem with these restrictions on reverse engineering based in copyright is that 
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The territorial limitations on patent and copyright provide no 
protection for an infringing act that occurs entirely extraterritori-
ally.34 Patent law’s application to extraterritorial acts may be an ex-
ample for copyright to follow, but, as with copyright, U.S. patent 
laws do not apply abroad. Copying necessary for reverse engineering 
that takes place abroad in violation of U.S. copyright law is not cur-
rently actionable according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
 
copyright law is territorial in nature, so liability naturally only extends to domestic infringing 
acts. Currently, a U.S.-based software company (“Company One”) can contract with a foreign 
software development firm to reverse engineer a software product created by another U.S. 
competitor. Company One can now take the functional aspects of the competitor’s software 
product and incorporate those functional elements into its own product in direct competition 
with the competitor, all without a single violation of U.S. copyright law. Due to the territorial 
limitations of copyright, Company One can thus essentially sidestep the law by “outsourcing” 
reverse engineering to a software company situated abroad and can then subsequently incorpo-
rate the ideas from the reverse-engineered software directly into a new product for distribution 
in the United States, clearly a hypertechnical, but effective, method of circumventing U.S. 
copyright law. 
 34. See supra Part II.A. Patent law, differing from copyright law, explicitly references 
U.S. territorial limitations in the patent statutes when determining patent infringement. See 35 
U.S.C. § 271 (1994). The statute makes reference to the assertion that parties will generally 
only be liable for patent infringement if at least part of the infringing activity takes place within 
United States territorial limits. “[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any pat-
ented invention . . . infringes the patent.” Id. The patent statute also provides for the “right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154. Courts 
have strictly applied the statute and have consistently limited the scope of patent protection to 
the territorial limits of the United States. See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 
641 (1915); Brown v. Duchesne, 42 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857). For example, in Deepsouth 
Packing Co. v. Laitram Co., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), Deepsouth manufactured the composite 
parts for a shrimp deveining machine that would infringe Laitram’s shrimp deveining machine 
if Deepsouth’s machine were sold or assembled in the United States. Deepsouth shipped the 
parts outside of the United States for assembly and use, essentially slipping though the cracks 
in the then-current patent act. Laitram brought an action against Deepsouth for contributory 
infringement for Deepsouth’s manufacture and exportation of the unassembled deveining ma-
chine. Laitram relied on § 271(b)’s language, which states that “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Id. at 522 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271 
(1964)). The Supreme Court held that the patent act did not extend extraterritorially to cover 
the acts of direct infringement that occurred abroad by the extraterritorial sale and assembly of 
the Deepsouth deveining machine. The Supreme Court further clarified the territorial limita-
tions of patent law by stating, “The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make 
or use a patented product outside of the United States.” Id. at 527. A showing of direct in-
fringement necessarily requires a showing that the infringing party “‘makes,’ ‘uses,’ or ‘sells’ 
the patented product within the bounds of this country.” Id. Following the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Deepsouth, as long as the allegedly infringing conduct occurs wholly extraterrito-
rially, a possible infringer will not be liable under U.S. patent law. 
15DALL.DOC 12/5/01  3:20 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1288 
exterritoriality.35 Companies doing business in the United States 
have an easy method of circumventing the copyright laws to their 
personal gain by doing their copying abroad; however, those persons 
or entities wanting to enforce their intellectual property rights still 
have other limited possibilities, such as third-party liability, for find-
ing retribution.36 
C. Contributory Infringement 
Through the application of third-party liability, the courts can 
hold third-party entities partially liable for extraterritorial infringing 
conduct. Contributory infringement is the basic concept of holding a 
third party liable for the acts of another due to a special relationship 
between the third party and the infringing party.37 Thus, the 
possibility exists that a third party residing within the territorial limits 
of the United States can be sued for copyright infringement 
perpetrated by a related party, even though the alleged infringement 
occurs entirely extraterritorially. But the law is unclear on whether a 
company residing in the United States would be liable in the 
situation where infringing copying occurs for the reverse engineering 
of software that an extraterritorial subsidiary or similarly associated 
(contracted) party perpetrates entirely abroad. 
1. Copyright and contributory infringement 
Copyright law provides for two types of third-party liability: con-
tributory infringement and vicarious liability. The principles are simi-
lar; contributory infringement is merely the broader application of 
traditional vicarious liability.38 
Contributory infringement extends liability for a direct infringing 
act to third parties based on (1) an association between the directly 
infringing party and the third party, and (2) a finding of underlying 
direct infringement.39 The copyright statute provides no explicit au-
thority for finding contributory infringement. In the reverse, how-
ever, the statute does not prohibit a court from finding contributory 
 
 35. See supra note 22. 
 36. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 37. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 38. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984). 
 39. See infra note 42. 
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infringement.40 The Supreme Court in Sony explained that “the con-
cept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader 
problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold 
one individual accountable for the actions of another.”41 To find 
contributory infringement, the Sony court relied on patent law con-
structs and the history of contributory infringement as applied in 
patent infringement cases.42 Following the patent law lead, the Court 
acknowledged the necessity of a “relationship between the direct in-
fringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing con-
duct occurred.”43 The Court further observed that in cases involving 
contributory infringement, liability would be justly found if “the 
‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of copy-
righted works by others.”44 Thus, as stated by the Second Circuit in 
 
 40. See Sony Corp. at 434 (noting that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render 
anyone liable for infringement committed by another”). 
 41. Id. at 435. 
 42. See id. at 439. Patent law expressly provides a cause of action for contributory in-
fringement as outlined in § 271, providing that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a 
patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. 271 (1994). Similar to copyright law, con-
tributory infringement in patent law also requires an underlying direct infringement; if no di-
rect infringement occurs, then contributory infringement cannot follow. See Deepsouth Pack-
ing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); supra Part II.B. Contributory 
infringement has the possibility of extending to actions that take place overseas; however, as 
indicated in Deepsouth, an underlying direct infringement must occur in the United States 
before a potential contributory infringer can be found liable for contributory infringement. See 
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 518. Contributory infringement in patent law will extend to any for-
eign entity that 
offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a 
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition . . . 
knowing the same to be . . . adapted for use in an infringement of such patent . . . 
shall be liable as a contributory infringer 
as long as some discernable act takes place in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp. 
2001). See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 518. If an infringing act occurs in the United States, an 
extraterritorial entity may thus be liable under U.S. patent law for patent infringement if the 
entity meets the other requirements of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Both patent 
and copyright law are bounded by the territorial limits of the United States. See EEOC v. Ara-
bian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that “[i]t is a longstanding princi-
ple of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to 
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros. v. Fi-
lardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). The Subafilms court determined that Congress intended 
copyright law to extend extraterritorially because absent language or congressional intent to 
the contrary, laws are to apply only domestically. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commu-
nications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 43. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 437. 
 44. Id. 
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Gershwin Publishing,45 a party “who, with knowledge of the infring-
ing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infring-
ing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ in-
fringer.”46 In essence, contributory infringement is operative if the 
third party (1) knowingly (2) causes or contributes (sometimes re-
quiring control by the third party) (3) the primary infringer to di-
rectly infringe the copyright in question. 
2. Copyright and vicarious liability 
In addition to contributory infringement, a third party may also 
be liable under the traditional form of third-party liability—vicarious 
liability. Again, the Second Circuit has enunciated a clear standard by 
imposing liability where the vicariously liable party has “the right and 
ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct finan-
cial interest in such activities.”47 Generally, vicarious liability has been 
based on the principle of respondeat superior, but, as indicated by 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Gershwin Publishing, vicarious liabil-
ity in the context of copyright infringement now extends beyond the 
employer-employee relationship.48 The House Report of the Copy-
right Act indicates that “profit” and the “right to control” are the 
dispositive factors; actual knowledge is not a prerequisite.49 Third 
parties must beware lest they be found liable under a theory of either 
contributory infringement or vicarious liability for a direct infringer’s 
conduct. 
Third-party liability in the form of contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability is merely a tool that may be used to partially dis-
suade foreign copyright infringements through the use of domestic 
 
 45. Gershwin Publ’g Co. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 46. Id. at 1162. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (2000). 
 49. See id. In reference to the liability of owners of ballrooms or night clubs for con-
tributory infringement, the House Report states: 
To be held a related or vicarious infringer in the case of performing rights, a defen-
dant must either actively operate or supervise the operation of the place wherein the 
performances occur, or control the content of the infringing program, and expect 
commercial gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from the in-
fringing performance. The committee has decided that no justification exists for 
changing the current law . . . . 
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), at 159–60.). The statute essentially codified the 
then-current common law. 
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law. Both doctrines have necessarily and traditionally required find-
ing at least one act of domestic infringement on which to base third-
party liability. These two third-party liability doctrines may be bene-
ficial; however, the doctrines circumvent the real problem of 
preventing extraterritorial copyright infringement by either the 
perpetrating party or, more importantly, the domestic party in 
position to reap the financial benefit of the foreign unlawful act. 
D. Importation of Infringing Goods 
Both patent and copyright law contain prohibitions on the im-
portation of items that infringe a copyright or patent granted in the 
United States;50 however, significant differences in protections 
granted by statute also exist. 
Compared to patent protection, copyright protection is more 
limited in scope by section 102’s language requiring that copy-
righted works be “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”51 The statutory requirement of “originality” 
dictates that the work must be an independent creation featuring a 
“modicum of creativity.”52 Similarly, copyright protection does not 
extend to ideas, “regardless of the form in which [the idea] is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”53 As de-
scribed by statute, section 602 will only grant the copyright owner 
the same protections against an imported infringing copy as the pro-
tections copyright law provides to the copyright owner against an in-
fringing copy created within the territorial limitation of the United 
States. Thus, the law treats liability for infringing imports the same as 
 
 50. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994). Patent protection applies to 
the discovery or invention of “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, to be 
patentable, an invention must meet other requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Even if another inventor independently creates or invents from 
scratch a similar or identical invention, the second inventor foregoes the right to make, use, 
sell, or offer to sell the patented work. See 35 U.S.C. § 271. Any person who imports an arti-
cle, even though independently created and patented extraterritorially, that violates (as deter-
mined by the patent statute) the patented invention is liable for patent infringement. See id. 
Patent law grants a full monopoly to the U.S. patent holder regardless of whether a foreign 
patent currently exists. Additionally, U.S. patent law keeps similar foreign or subsequent inde-
pendently created patents out of the U.S. market for the duration of the original patent cover-
ing the invention. 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 52. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
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infringing copies created within U.S. territorial limits. 
Copyright, through section 602, also acts to prevent a party from 
importing an infringing derivative work.54 However, in the case of 
software, a party can circumvent U.S. law and reverse-engineer a 
product abroad without incorporating any element of expression 
from the original work, rendering the protection against importing 
derivative works worthless as a tool for preventing extraterritorial in-
fringement involving the copying necessary to reverse-engineer pro-
tected or copyrighted software. 
Preventing the importation of infringing items preserves the 
copyright monopoly in the United States, but a U.S. entity can still 
reap the profits of works infringed and distributed abroad with the 
subsequent profits returning and pooling in a U.S. entity. The cur-
rent copyright law will not deter U.S. entities from making profits 
abroad by infringing U.S. copyrights in foreign jurisdictions because 
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the U.S. courts clearly 
may exercise personal jurisdiction. 
E. Liability for Extraterritorial Conduct When at Least One 
Infringing Act Occurs in the United States 
Liability for extraterritorial conduct can take the form of con-
tributory infringement, as long as at least one direct act of infringe-
ment occurs within the territorial limits of the United States.55 Tradi-
tionally, courts have held that liability for extraterritorial direct 
infringements can also be remedied under the ability of the courts to 
extend remedies for copyright infringement to infringing acts 
abroad, as long as at least one infringing act occurs within the terri-
torial limits of the United States.56 Beginning with Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,57 courts have recognized that if an 
associated act of territorial copyright infringement occurs, a copy-
right owner can successfully sue for the extraterritorial profits based 
on the extraterritorial infringement, even though the profits resulted 
from infringing activity abroad.58 In Sheldon, the infringer appropri-
 
 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 602; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (recognizing the exclusive right in 
the copyright holder to create derivative works based on the copyrighted work). 
 55. See supra Part II.C. 
 56. See 17 U.S.C. § 504; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 
(1940); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
 57. 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 58. Cf. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (stating in dicta 
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ated part of a play into a motion picture that was shown domesti-
cally, as well as abroad.59 The issue before the court was whether, in 
granting a remedy of profits, all of the profits from the film, both 
domestic and foreign, or only the profits directly derived from the 
infringement, should be granted to the copyright owner.60 
The infringing party argued that copyright law does not apply 
extraterritorially, so profits from extraterritorial infringement should 
be exempt from any accounting.61 The Second Circuit found that the 
extraterritorial infringement was based, in large part, on direct in-
fringement that originally occurred within the United States.62 “The 
[defendant] made the negatives in this country, or had them made 
here, and shipped them abroad, where the positives were produced 
and exhibited. The negatives were ‘records’ from which the work 
could be ‘reproduced’, and it was a tort to make them in this coun-
try.”63 The court held that upon creation of the infringing “records” 
in the United States, “[t]he plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest 
in them . . . which attached to any profits from their exploitation.”64 
The court further assumed that any profits “took the form of prop-
erty whose situs was in the United States.”65 The court, in essence, 
allowed the plaintiff to recover for profits directly attributable to ter-
ritorial and extraterritorial infringement, as long as a directly related 
prerequisite infringing act, which enabled the foreign infringement, 
took place in the United States. 
Copyright holders can utilize a strong tool in preventing foreign 
infringements where at least one infringing act occurs in the United 
States, but the same copyright holder seems to be at an extreme loss 
 
that if Deepsouth infringed the patent in the United States, liability may be incurred for related 
extraterritorial conduct). See generally Sheldon, 106 F.2d. 45; Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin 
Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that copyright law, even though terri-
torial in nature, can apply abroad when infringement in the United States “permits further re-
production abroad”); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 560 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding that as long as a prerequisite act of direct infringement enabling ex-
traterritorial infringement occurred in the United States, the copyright owner could recover 
profits from the foreign infringement in proportion to the extent the infringement contributed 
to profits). 
 59. See Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 48, 52. 
 60. See id. at 48–49. 
 61. See id. at 51–52. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. at 52. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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under current law if no direct infringement occurs domestically. The 
absence of congressional intent with respect to contributory in-
fringement and vicarious liability has created two opposing views 
with respect to the necessity of requiring an underlying direct in-
fringement before finding third-party liability. Some courts have 
found the underlying domestic infringement requirements in the “to 
authorize” language of section 106, finding that to hold otherwise 
would recognize a seemingly outdated, outmoded hypertechnicality 
in the law that fails to recognize the current breadth of the digital 
age.66 The fear is that requiring an underlying infringing act other 
than “authorization” to occur domestically before finding third-party 
liability will prevent an infringer from paying what is owed the copy-
right holder for an unlawful infringing act. In response to the tradi-
tional view of copyright and in relation to territoriality, some courts 
have found third- party liability based on an “authorization right,” 
even though infringement does not otherwise occur domestically.67 
The controversy arises when determining whether third-party liabil-
ity actually requires underlying domestic infringement other than au-
thorization, or merely some recognized violation of section 106, 
domestic or abroad.68 The results are unclear. 
III. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAW TO CERTAIN FOREIGN 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS 
Copyright law should be interpreted more expansively to include 
extraterritorial infringements occurring abroad that benefit U.S. enti-
ties, especially where the U.S. entity is a contributory infringer. Even 
though copyright law does not extend to infringements abroad, cer-
tain provisions or “exceptions and extensions” in current practice al-
low U.S. courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a limited 
number of foreign actions. Contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability69 allow the courts to exercise jurisdiction over a party and the 
ensuing infringement where the party, “with knowledge of the in-
fringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the in-
fringing conduct of another.”70  Such a party “may be held liable as a 
 
 66. See infra Part III.A.2.a–b. 
 67. See infra Part III.A.2.a–b. 
 68. See infra Part III.A. 
 69. See supra Part II.C. 
 70. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
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‘contributory’ infringer.”71 Protecting against importation of infring-
ing goods also prevents infringing goods from entering and affecting 
the U.S. market. This protection, however, does not preclude in-
fringements from occurring abroad, nor do the protections keep 
domestic entities from benefiting by circumventing the law.72 An-
other more controversial and expansive method of exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction over foreign infringement is to recognize an in-
dependent cause of action in the “to authorize” language of section 
106.73 The law remains unclear whether a cause of action based 
solely on the authorization language is valid where no underlying 
domestic infringement occurs.74 Recognizing a cause of action based 
on the “to authorize” language of section 106 or expansively treat-
ing the currently recognized “to authorize”-based contributory in-
fringement would prevent circumvention of copyright law and pro-
hibit U.S. entities from making unlawful profits from infringements 
perpetrated abroad. 
A. The “To Authorize” Language of Section 106 
1. The Subafilms decision: No new right based on the “to 
authorize” language 
In Subafilms,75 the Ninth Circuit limited liability under the “to 
authorize” language of section 106 to contributory infringement re-
quiring domestic direct infringement.76 At least two other courts and 
numerous commentators have criticized the Subafilms court’s deci-
sion that mere authorization in the United States of an infringing act 
that occurs outside of the United States does not constitute liability 
for the authorizing party under direct or contributory infringe-
 
1971). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra Part II.A. 
 73. See infra Part III.A.1–2. 
 74. See infra Part III.A.1–2. 
 75. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 
1994) (en banc). The original three-judge panel in Subafilms affirmed the lower court’s find-
ing of infringement, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s prior holding in Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. 
Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-
Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 4068 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 76. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1088. 
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ment.77 In Subafilms, the issue was whether a company was liable for 
contributory infringement where that company, through its subsidi-
ary, authorized the wholly extraterritorial sale and distribution of a 
film in which the company had no intellectual property right.78 To 
confront the problem, the Subafilms court drew an analogy from 
patent law analysis found in previous Supreme Court cases that disal-
lowed a cause of action for contributory patent infringement where 
no underlying direct infringement occurred due to the wholly extra-
territorial nature of the direct infringement.79 
The key points of the Subafilms court’s analysis turned on an ex-
amination of the language in section 106 where “the owner of copy-
right under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
any of the following,”80 and the allegation that the directly infringing 
action occurred wholly extraterritorially.81 The court held that viola-
tion of the “to authorize” phrase does not constitute a violation un-
der section 50182 of the act unless the underlying “authorized” ac-
tion actually violates one of the six exclusive rights in section 106, 
which would result in an infringement under section 501.83 The 
court held that “to authorize” is not cognizable as a separate right 
under section 106; the court further held that the addition of the 
words “to authorize” to section 106 did not add a new cause of ac-
 
 77. See, e.g., Expediters Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
995 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1998); Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Tenn. 
1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritioriality in Copyright Infringement, 
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 600 (1997). 
 78. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1088. 
 79. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972). (“It is 
plain that . . . the Patent Code enacted in 1952 [] made no change in the fundamental precept 
that there can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct infringement.”) 
(quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961)); see 
also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting on other grounds). 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
 81. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089–90, 1093. The court also relied in part upon the 
Supreme Court’s “analogized” use of patent law to help determine copyright cases “because of 
the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). Other courts have found liability to exist where 
at least one act of infringement occurred in the United States. See, e.g., Ahbez v. Edwin H. 
Morris & Co., 548 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, 
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 83. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090–94. 
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tion based on mere authorization of an infringing act.84 The court 
stated that the addition of the language “to authorize” was “in-
tended to invoke the preexisting doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment.”85 
In overruling the Ninth Circuit’s own previous decision in Peter 
Starr Products Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc.,86 where the 
court held that “authorization, . . . standing alone, is sufficient to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction,”87 the Subafilms court, sitting en 
banc, held that mere authorization of an infringing act occurring ex-
traterritorially cannot constitute copyright infringement.88 First, con-
 
 84. See id. at 1092. The court acknowledged that under the “to authorize” language, a 
party can still be directly liable for authorizing an underlying infringement cognizable under 
the copyright act. Essentially, the court recognized that the addition of the “to infringe” lan-
guage in section 106 requires or allows contributory infringers who authorize infringing acts to 
be held directly liable for copyright infringement, but a prerequisite is that the authorizing 
party must first be liable for contributory infringement; contributory infringement requires that 
direct infringement occur. If no underlying direct infringement occurs, then contributory in-
fringement does not exist. In making this assertion, the Subafilms court relied on a patent in-
fringement case, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), where the 
Supreme Court held that a party could not be held liable for contributory infringement under 
patent law unless an underlying act of direct infringement occurred, and that the “authorizing” 
party obviously could not be directly liable under the “to authorize” language of § 106. 
Allowing parties to be held liable for authorizing infringing conduct would open up the 
possibility for large amounts of litigation based on the “to infringe” language. Liability for au-
thorizing infringement would be particularly unfair in cases where no underlying territorial or 
extraterritorial direct infringement occurs. The Subafilms court took great pains to explain 
these prerequisites and differences in its opinion. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d.at 1092–94. 
 85. Id. at 1092. The court further stated: 
The exclusive rights accorded to a copyright owner under section 106 are “to do 
and to authorize” any of the activities specified in the five numbered clauses. Use of 
the phrase “to authorize” is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of 
contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized 
copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business 
of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance. 
Id. at 1093 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 61 (1976)). 
 86. 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). In Peter Starr, the Ninth Circuit held that liability 
extends to the authorizing party by the mere authorization in the United States of an infring-
ing act that occurs extraterritorially even though no direct violation occurs in the United 
States. See id. 
 87. Id. at 1443. In coming to a conclusion, the Peter Starr court relied on language in a 
footnote in Sony stating that “an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without 
authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted 
work without actual authority from the copyright owner.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984). The Peter Starr court essentially relied on the 
dicta of a footnote for its main holding in the case. 
 88. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090–92. 
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tributory infringement generally requires an act of direct infringe-
ment and, second, copyright law does not extend to direct acts of in-
fringement occurring extraterritorially. Thus, according to the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning, a foreign violation of one of the six exclusive 
rights under section 106 is not an infringement recognized or ac-
tionable due to the territorial limitations of U.S. law.89 
2. Curb and Expediters International: Recognizing a new cause of 
action by the addition of the “to authorize” language to section 106 
a. Curb. In Curb v. MCA Records, Inc.,90 a motion for summary 
judgment, one of the questions before the court was whether the “to 
infringe” language of section 106 stated a cause of action when the 
“authorized” direct infringement occurred wholly extraterritorially.91 
The “authorizing” party in Curb argued that it did nothing more 
than sign contracts with extraterritorial entities authorizing the dis-
tribution abroad of “sound recordings in which Curb had a license 
to reproduce [domestically].”92 Finding no precedent in the Sixth 
Circuit, the Curb court looked to the Ninth Circuit and Subafilms.93 
The Curb court rejected the Subafilms holding that the “to author-
ize” language was merely an extension of direct liability to contribu-
tory infringement by holding that the Subafilms decision was con-
trary to precedent, current reality, and legislative history.94 
 
 89. See id.; see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
 90. 898 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). 
 91. See id. at 593. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. n.3. 
 94. See id. at 594 (holding that “tying the authorization right solely to a claim of justi-
ciable contributory infringement appears contrary both to well-reasoned precedent, statutory 
text, and legislative history”). “Subafilms, thus, reads the authorization right out of the Act in 
cases of foreign infringement.” Id. at 595. Interestingly enough, however, the court provides 
no authority for its assertion other than policy arguments recited by the court and California 
district court cases subsequently overruled by the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms. The Curb court 
outlined policy arguments similar to the following excerpt: 
But piracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today, the raider need not grab the 
bounty with his own hands; he need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to 
start the presses in a distant land. Subafilms ignores this economic reality, and the 
economic incentives underpinning the Copyright Clause designed to encourage the 
creation of new works, and transforms infringement of the authorization right into a 
requirement of domestic presence by a primary infringer. Under this view, a phone 
call to Nebraska results in liability; the same phone call to France results in riches. In 
a global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a difference. 
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Even though the Curb court tentatively rejected the Subafilms 
holding, the Curb court further found that Curb, the defendant in-
fringer, must likely have infringed the sound recording domestically 
by creating a master copy of the recording in the United States to 
send to its distributors overseas—a direct act of domestic infringe-
ment unless Curb sent its originals, which was highly unlikely.95 The 
Curb decision almost supports Subafilms by suggesting that even if 
the Curb court is wrong in rejecting Subafilms, Curb likely commit-
ted an underlying domestic act of direct infringement on which to 
predicate a finding of contributory infringement, still making Curb 
liable under the Subafilms court’s interpretation of the “to author-
ize” language.96 Nevertheless, the Curb court later tried to distin-
guish its reasoning by relying on policy arguments and legislative his-
tory to find that an underlying domestic direct infringement is not 
required. The Curb court tried laboriously to convince itself that the 
“to authorize” language constituted a separate right.97 
The Curb court finally concluded that domestic direct infringe-
ment, other than a violation of the “to authorize” language, of a sec-
tion 106 exclusive right is not required to find an “authorizing” 
party directly liable for infringement based on the “to authorize” 
language of section 106. The court held that liability extends to the 
“authorizer” regardless of the location of the direct infringement, 
despite of the restrictions on extraterritorial application of copyright 
law cited in its own opinion and by the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms.98 
The only requirement for infringement set forth by the Curb court is 
that the “authorized” activity be “the sort of activity that infringes 
upon a copyright owner’s exclusive 106 rights”;99 however, accord-
ing to the Curb court, that infringing activity need not take place 
domestically because of Curb’s recognition of a separate right “to 
authorize.” 
 
 Id. at 595. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. “A better view, one supported by the text, the precedents, and, ironically 
enough, the legislative history . . . , would be to hold that domestic violation of the authoriza-
tion right is an infringement . . . whenever the authorizee has committed an act that would 
violate the copyright owner’s § 106 rights.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. See generally id. at 593; Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 99. Curb, 898 F. Supp. at 595–96. The Curb court relied on California district court 
precedent that was subsequently overruled in the Ninth Circuit’s Subafilms decision. 
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b. Expediters International. In Expediters International of Wash-
ington, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Management Systems, Inc.,100 the 
court followed the reasoning of the Curb court and determined that 
a separate right “to authorize” exists under section 106. Expediters 
International (“EI”) sued Direct Line (“DLCMS”) for copyright in-
fringement that occurred entirely overseas beyond the scope of U.S. 
copyright law.101 DLCMS mailed a lawfully licensed copy of EI’s 
software overseas to its subsidiaries. After the license expired, the 
subsidiaries continued to use the software, in violation of the soft-
ware license agreement.102 
Similar to Subafilms, the copyright infringement issue before the 
court was whether DLCMS could be liable under the “to authorize” 
language of section 106 for its actions in continuing to allow the 
subsidiaries to use the software in violation of the software license 
agreement.103 The Expediters court acknowledged the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding in Subafilms, where the court held that the “author-
ized” direct infringement must actually occur domestically before an 
authorizing party will be held liable as a contributory infringer.104 
The Expediters court repeated the Subafilms rule that if the direct 
infringement occurred extraterritorially, the “authorizing” party 
would not be liable because copyright law does not apply extraterri-
torially and no actionable direct infringement exists on which to base 
contributory infringement.105 However, the Expediters court rejected 
the Ninth Circuit’s rule and chose to follow Curb.106 The Curb court 
held that the “to authorize” language of section 106 created an in-
dependent action for direct liability (infringement), not an action for 
contributory infringement that relies on an act of direct infringement 
occurring domestically.”107 In holding that liability exists under the 
“to authorize” language, the Expediters court relied on policy argu-
ments set forth in Curb, “which appear more closely adapted to our 
 
 100. 995 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 101. See id. at 468, 475. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 475–77. 
 104. See id. at 476. See generally Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co. 
24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 105. See Expediters, 995 F. Supp. at 476; supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 106. See Expediters, 995 F. Supp. at 476. 
 107. See id. at 476–77; Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595–96 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1995). 
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modern age of telefaxes, Internet communication, and electronic 
mail systems.”108 The court further acknowledged that the “purpose 
behind the Copyright Act is to protect a copyright owner’s right to 
be free from infringement”109 and that “[t]o allow an entity to curtail 
this right by merely directing its foreign agent to do its ‘dirty work’ 
would . . . hinder the deterrent effect of the statute and thwart its 
underlying purpose.”110 The Expediters court rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s analysis by looking past the letter of the law, and relied on 
copyright protection policies to find liability where no direct territo-
rial infringement occurred. 
3. Subafilms Versus Curb and Expediters: Which analysis better 
serves to promote the policies of the Copyright Act? 
The Curb and Expediters courts’ recognition of liability, based 
on the “to authorize” language of section 106 where an underlying 
foreign or domestic direct infringement occurs, serves to promote 
the underlying policies of the Copyright Act. Curb and Expediters 
both adhere to international comity concerns by finding third-party 
copyright liability where a domestic authorization (a domestic in-
fringing action) leads to direct infringement. Neither court would 
find liability for the directly infringing foreign party because finding 
such liability would extend the bounds of copyright law beyond its 
territorial limits. Also, neither court would find liability for mere au-
thorization where no underlying direct infringement occurs. 
The position advocated by the Curb and Expediters courts with 
respect to the “to authorize” language of the Copyright Act better 
serves the policies and protections of the act than the Ninth Circuit’s 
position requiring domestic direct infringement. Literally, the differ-
ence between the two positions is not whether direct infringement 
occurs, but whether the direct infringement is domestic or foreign. 
Recognizing liability under the “to authorize” language, as outlined 
by Curb and Expediters, follows legal precedent and legislative his-
tory by finding third-party liability in the form of contributory in-
fringement. The only difference is in the Subafilms requirement that 
the direct infringement occur domestically. In either the domestic or 
foreign direct infringement case, the underlying direct infringement 
 
 108. Expediters, 995 F. Supp. at 476–77. 
 109. Id. at 477. 
 110. Id. 
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still occurs and the entity or entities infringing or endorsing the in-
fringement still benefit financially from the infringement regardless 
of whether the law recognizes the unlawful act. 
The Subafilms court, in its reluctance to find copyright infringe-
ment, focused on the wrong question: whether direct extraterritorial 
infringement is cognizable direct infringement under U.S. copyright 
law. The Subafilms court should have focused on whether some type 
of direct infringement actually occurred. The Ninth Circuit was per-
plexed by the question of whether recognizing a separate cause of ac-
tion based on the “to authorize” language would open up a plethora 
of cases focusing on authorization instead of infringement. The 
Ninth Circuit clearly erred in its assumption that an action based on 
the “to authorize” language would open the courts to new litigation 
because the court failed to recognize the real issue. The Subafilms 
court failed to recognize that the perfectly logical path to follow was 
to allow a cause of action based on the “to authorize” language re-
gardless of where the direct infringement occurred, instead of limit-
ing the underlying direct infringement to the territorial limits of U.S. 
law. The Ninth Circuit assumed that by allowing a cause of action 
based on the “to authorize” language, the law would have to recog-
nize a cause of action based on mere authorization without the ne-
cessity of an underlying direct infringement. 
The Curb court, on the other hand, clearly explained that au-
thorization itself should only give rise to infringement where some 
form of direct infringement occurs—wherever the direct infringe-
ment occurs. The Curb court further explained that the direct in-
fringement should not be restricted to direct infringement occurring 
domestically. The inquiry is not where the direct infringement oc-
curs, but where the “authorization” of the direct infringement oc-
curs. When the “authorization” occurs domestically, the authorizing 
party should be liable domestically, even though the direct infringe-
ment occurs abroad. Focusing on the wrong question—whether 
domestic direct infringement occurs, instead of simply requiring 
some form of direct infringement, domestic or abroad—detracted 
from the soundness of the Subafilms decision. Curb is not advocat-
ing finding liability based solely on the “to authorize” language. 
Rather, Curb still requires an act of direct infringement, domestic or 
foreign.111 
 
 111. There is a problem with respect to determining whether direct infringement exists. 
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As indicated by the Curb court, the Subafilms decision failed to 
recognize the current state of the Internet, international companies, 
and international business agreements. The Curb court clearly 
pointed out this issue, noting that a “phone call to Nebraska results 
in liability; the same phone call to France results in riches.”112 
The position advocated by Curb and Expediters surpasses the 
Subafilms decision with respect to the current global economy and 
the proliferation of the Internet. With the use of the Internet, a party 
may transmit electronic information nearly anywhere in the world. 
Following the Curb holding that the “to authorize” right is violated 
anytime a party authorizes an infringement that violates a section 
106 exclusive right, promoting copyright protection in the Internet 
age will allow entities to better enforce their intellectual property 
rights by allowing the courts to exercise jurisdiction over companies 
authorizing extraterritorial infringing actions. Subafilms undermines 
a copyright holder’s ability to enforce its rights against another U.S. 
entity perpetrating (authorizing and financially backing) infringe-
ments outside the territorial bounds of the United States. An entity 
should not be able to make large profits from another’s intellectual 
property by simply evading the law by locating infringing activities 
outside the territorial limits of the United States, especially when the 
entities profiting from the infringements are U.S. entities promoting 
and financing the operations.113 Expediters and Curb “curb” these 
types of extraterritorial infringements allowed by Subafilms. 
B. Preventing Copyright Violations Through the Application of 
United States Law to Certain Foreign Infringements 
Copyright law provides a limited number of tools to combat ex-
traterritorial infringement, including finding liability for contributory 
infringement and vicarious liability, preventing importation of in-
 
At least two choices of law exist: U.S. law or the law of the country where the direct infringe-
ment occurs. If the law of the country where the direct infringement occurs is applied and that 
law is more forgiving than U.S. law with respect to direct infringements, the party suing to 
enforce its rights may still be without an adequate legal solution. 
 112. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). 
 113. Intentional circumventions of copyright law in the manner expressed above are un-
certain. Many countries, especially adherents to the Berne Convention, see infra note 117, 
have similar copyright protections. The DMCA uniquely guards certain works protected by 
copyright access controls and provides an example where U.S. law may be more restrictive than 
another nation’s laws. 
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fringing goods, extending third-party liability based on “authoriza-
tion,” and allowing recovery for foreign infringement where at least 
one infringing action occurs territorially. None of these tools is ade-
quate to prevent all foreign infringements, but these tools do provide 
a limited range of actions where a copyright holder may seek retribu-
tion for infringements occurring abroad. Basing liability on the “au-
thorization” right and not requiring the primary infringement to oc-
cur domestically definitely expands copyright protection to 
“authorizing” parties who would otherwise be liable had the primary 
infringement occurred in the United States. Allowing such a right 
would prove to beneficial in promoting intellectual property protec-
tions. At the same time, however, concerns of international comity 
would seemingly require the law of the territory where the infringe-
ment occurred to be applied. A U.S. entity with little or no affiliation 
to a foreign entity could escape all liability by merely authorizing a 
foreign entity to do the “dirty work” in a jurisdiction abroad—an 
unintended result of a small loophole in copyright law protections. 
Intellectual property interests and protections call for allowing a 
cause of action based on the “authorization” of section 106. 
IV. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW 
Courts in the United States have traditionally shied away from 
applying foreign intellectual property law to foreign infringements in 
U.S. courts.114 International intellectual property treaties creating a 
unified standard for certain intellectual property protections have ar-
guably alleviated the need for courts to pass judgment on the foreign 
states’ administrative formalities necessary to perfect foreign intellec-
tual property protections.115 U.S. courts may be less likely to dismiss 
cases applying foreign law to foreign copyright infringements be-
cause of the uniformity in the law after the Berne Convention and 
the fact that the particular U.S. court may be the only court with the 
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over the infringing party for 
numerous infringements occurring in multiple countries.116 
 
 114. See infra Part IV.B. 
 115. See infra Part IV.B; infra Part IV.A. 
 116. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. The Berne Convention 
Multiple international treaties exist for the protection of intellec-
tual property on an international scale, one of which is the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,117 ini-
tially ratified by a small number of countries,118 but subsequently 
adopted by a majority of the world’s nations.119 The Berne Conven-
tion calls for the protection of expression “fixed in some material 
form,”120 whether published or unpublished for a minimum time pe-
riod of the life of the author plus fifty years.121 The Convention also 
calls for a “minimum” baseline protectionist approach, but the indi-
vidual countries are free to grant protections greater than those re-
quired by the treaty.122 Signatories to the Convention must grant at 
least the minimum copyright protections outlined in the treaty by 
their own domestic laws in their own country to non-nationals. Per-
haps the most powerful aspect of the treaty is the Convention’s pro-
vision for the protection of the works of non-nationals. The Berne 
Convention requires that signatory countries grant non-nationals the 
same protection afforded nationals without respect to a need to con-
form to a given country’s statutory or administrative formalities, such 
as a requirement for notice or for registration of the copyrighted 
work with a governmental agency.123 Granting the same protections 
also includes allowing the non-national to enforce his or her copy-
right rights under the domestic laws of the country where the in-
fringing activity occurs.124 Thus, the Berne Convention strives to 
 
 117. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 
1986, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 118. Those countries ratifying the treaty within the next year were Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. See 
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/docs/english/e-berne.doc (last visited January 13, 2001). 
Subsequently, numerous other countries have become party to the Convention, including the 
United States on March 1, 1989. See id. Noticeably absent from the list is Taiwan; however, 
political problems between mainland China (a party to the Berne Convention since 1992) and 
Taiwan, due to the latter’s partial “independence,” may explain Taiwan’s nonparticipation. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Berne Convention, supra note 117, art. 2. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. art. 19. 
 123. See id. art. 5. The protection afforded non-nationals must, of course, meet the mini-
malist protections outlined in the Convention. The signatory countries may still require their 
own nationals to register copyrights in order to receive copyright protection. The Convention 
only requires protecting non-national’s work without the requirement of registration. 
 124. Id. 
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maintain minimum requirements for copyright protection for na-
tionals and non-nationals alike among the member countries; the 
Convention also provides that non-nationals may enforce their copy-
rights according to the domestic laws in the country where the in-
fringement takes place. 
B. Application of Foreign Law in the Courts of the United States to 
Extraterritorial Copyright Infringements 
1. London Film: The choice to exercise jurisdiction and apply 
foreign law 
In London Film Productions., Ltd. v. Intercontinental 
Communications, Inc.,125 the questions before the court were (1) 
whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction to foreign conduct, 
and (2) whether the court should apply foreign copyright law to the 
alleged foreign infringement.126 London Film, a British corporation, 
sued Intercontinental Communications, a New York corporation, for 
infringements of London Film’s British copyright in several South 
American countries.127 In essence, London Film asked a U.S. court 
to enforce London Film’s British copyright in the South American 
countries according to the respective countries’ laws in a U.S. court. 
London Films argued that the countries in question adhered to the 
Berne Convention, which afforded London Film a cause of action 
based on its British copyright according to the domestic laws of the 
South American countries where the alleged infringing acts took 
place.128 The New York forum was likely the only forum where the 
allegedly infringing party was subject to personal jurisdiction for all 
of the alleged copyright violations.129 At the time, the United States 
had not yet ratified the Convention, but the court was asked to apply 
the principles of the Convention to the copyright question at hand. 
The court recognized that applying foreign law to the action was 
 
 125. 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 126. See id. at 48. At the time of London Film, the United States had not yet become a 
party to the Berne Convention. See supra note 118. 
 127. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 48. Plaintiff London Film alleged no copyright 
infringement in violation of U.S. copyright law. 
 128. See id. (“[P]laintiff’s claims would have to be determined with reference to each of 
the South American states in which the alleged copyright infringements occurred.”). 
 129. See id. at 48–49. 
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not something the court was specialized in doing. Nevertheless, the 
court was concerned that the defendant would not be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction for all the infringing acts in any other forum.130 
The court recognized that “not every violation of foreign law by a 
citizen of this country must be afforded a local tribunal.”131 How-
ever, the court recognized the need to adjudicate claims against U.S. 
nationals under foreign law if the United States expects reciprocal 
treatment from other nations.132 Traditionally, in trademark and pat-
ent law, part of determining whether a trademark or a patent is valid 
is if the particular administrative formalities of the state has been 
met; if such a determination is required, the courts have chosen not 
to exercise jurisdiction and the courts refrain from exercising judg-
ment on the validity of the foreign nation’s administrative proc-
esses.133 In London Film, the court relied in part on Professor Nim-
mer’s argument that, under the Berne Convention in signatory 
countries, no “act of state” or administrative formality is required to 
perfect copyright since the Berne Convention necessarily perfects the 
copyright,134 so the copyright “right” is transitory and can be adjudi-
cated in any forum convenient to the litigators.135 Since no “adminis-
 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. at 49. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. at 49–50. Requiring administrative formalities for trademark and patent reg-
istration in a foreign jurisdiction would require the court to pass judgment on the validity of 
the foreign process, something no foreign court is really prepared to do. Passing judgment on 
the validity of administrative proceedings would necessarily implicate the “act of state” doc-
trine. In relation to trademark law, which differs in the required amount of administrative ac-
tion by the domestic government agencies, the Second Circuit in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. 
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), stated that “we do not think it the province of 
United States district courts to determine the validity of trade-marks which officials of foreign 
countries have seen fit to grant. To do so would . . . welcome conflicts with the administrative 
and judicial officers [of the foreign jurisdiction].” Id. at 647. 
 134. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (2000). Professor Nimmer notes that if per-
sonal jurisdiction can be obtained, a U.S. court could exercise jurisdiction over the copyright 
claim “on the theory that copyright infringement constitutes a transitory cause of action . . . 
and may be adjudicated in the courts of a sovereign other than the one in which the cause of 
action arose.” Id. Further, “under virtually all foreign copyright laws, there are no administra-
tive formalities that must be satisfied . . . [and] there is . . . no need to pass upon the validity of 
the acts of foreign government officials.” Id. 
 135. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 48–49. In addition to reliance on Professor Nim-
mer, the court further relied on reciprocity to validate its position: 
The Court has an obvious interest in securing compliance with this nation’s laws by 
citizens of foreign nations . . . . An unwillingness by this Court to hear a complaint 
against its own citizens with regard to a violation of foreign law will engender . . . a 
15DALL.DOC 12/5/01  3:20 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1308 
trative formality” was required to perfect the copyrights in question, 
the court did not believe the need for comity necessarily implicated 
deferral to the courts of the forum where the infringement oc-
curred.136 The London Films court found jurisdiction in the United 
States was proper.137 The court later dismissed the claim on other 
grounds, so full adjudication of the issues never took place.138 No 
other court has yet chosen to exercise jurisdiction in a similar man-
ner,139 but commentators have supported the court’s analysis as 
groundwork for future copyright litigation.140 
2. Boosey and Hawkes Music Publishers: The choice not to exercise 
jurisdiction or apply foreign law 
Contrary to the London Film court, the district court in Boosey 
and Hawkes Music Publishers141 declined to apply foreign law and 
dismissed foreign copyright actions pertaining to eighteen jurisdic-
tions142 brought against Walt Disney Company by Boosey and 
 
similar unwillingness on the part of a foreign jurisdiction when the question arises 
concerning a violation of our laws by one of its citizens . . . . 
 Id. at 49. But see David R. Toraya, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Copyright In-
fringement Actions—An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 
(1985). For a general discussion on the holding of the London Films court, see Toraya, supra 
(contrasting Professor Nimmer’s approach with an “interests” test where the court should bal-
ance four factors: (1) the court’s ability to make an informed disposition of the foreign action, 
(2) the nature of the issues presented, (3) the suitability of American enforcement of the 
judgment, and (4) the convenience of the litigants and of the forum). 
 136. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 49–50. 
 137. See id. at 50. (“[T]he Court finds it has jurisdiction over the instant case . . . .”). 
But see Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing on grounds of forum non conviens). Boosey was later overruled 
by the Second Circuit on several issues, including the dismissal on grounds of forum non con-
viens. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 138. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 47. 
 139. See Boosey, 934 F. Supp. at 119 (dismissing on grounds of forum non conviens); 
Boosey, 145 F.3d at 481 (overturning the circuit court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction 
on grounds of forum non conveniens because the district court did not adequately balance the 
necessary private and public interest factors). 
 140. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (2000). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, 
Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997). 
 141. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 142. The eighteen jurisdictions were the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan. See id. at 122 n.1. The listed countries are all 
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Hawkes.143 The district court, declining to exercise jurisdiction, 
stated that “the balance of factors strongly favor trial of the copy-
right issues in each of the nations whose copyright laws are in-
voked.”144 Subsequently, the court, relying on public policy concerns 
noting that foreign jurisdictions are best equipped to apply their own 
law, dismissed all copyright actions involving the foreign jurisdic-
tions.145 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision pertain-
ing to the dismissal of the alleged copyright violations on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens.146 The Second Circuit held that 
the district court did not adequately take into account “[t]he private 
interests of the litigants [in] conducting the litigation in New 
York.”147 Rather, the district court based its findings almost entirely 
on public interest factors centered on the foreign jurisdiction’s inter-
est in applying its own law to the copyright violations.148 Upon bal-
ancing private and public factors, the Second Circuit overturned the 
district court’s ruling, finding that, overall, the factors weighed in fa-
vor of maintaining the suit in New York.149 In comparison to Lon-
don Film, however, Boosey implicated issues other than merely ap-
plying foreign law to extraterritorial copyright infringement.150 The 
 
party to the Berne Convention where the signatories agreed to grant other countries the same 
copyright protections as their own nationals. See supra Part IV.A. 
 143. See Boosey, 934 F. Supp. at 124. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. (“Those issues are better litigated in the countries where enforcement of the 
copyright is sought. The task of discerning the varying policies and laws governing copyright 
protection and antitrust issues in each of the eighteen countries is an undue burden on our 
judicial system.”). 
 146. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 491–
92 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 147. Id. at 492. 
 148. See id. “While reluctance to apply foreign law is a valid factor favoring dismissal un-
der [Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947)], standing alone it does not jus-
tify dismissal.” Id. 
 149. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 491–92. Part of the reasoning for the circuit court’s deci-
sion is that the contracts licensing distribution were signed in New York; New York was most 
likely the best forum to adjudicate all of the foreign claims at once instead of requiring the 
plaintiff to travel to each separate forum; New York favored the convenience of the parties, 
counsel, and witnesses; no other alternative, better forum was found by the district court or 
suggested by the parties; and adjudicating the action in New York would most likely prove the 
least expensive to both parties. See id. 
 150. See generally id. Other nonexclusive issues discussed in the case included a dispute 
over the license agreement, violations of the Lanham Act, and breach of contract. See id. 
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Boosey district court initially failed to conclude what the Second 
Circuit and the London Film court promptly decided—that the fo-
rum in which the plaintiff filed suit was likely the most convenient 
forum for the parties involved, especially when the court could prop-
erly exercise general personal jurisdiction. 
C. Using Foreign Law to Prevent Copyright Infringement 
With the United States’ ratification of the Berne Convention and 
subsequent cases holding jurisdiction and application of foreign law 
proper over foreign copyright infringements, copyright owners have 
increased the number of tools they can use in seeking to curb reverse 
engineering of copyrighted software and other infringing copyright 
violations. By affording non-nationals the same protection as nation-
als, the Berne Convention helps prevent infringements to the extent 
the country’s domestic law provides for copyright protections. Still, if 
the country’s laws grant less protection than U.S. copyright laws, the 
party seeking protection will not be at any advantage because of the 
Convention. 
A large limitation in the law exists when the foreign country’s 
laws do not provide protection equivalent to that of the United 
States. This problem is further exacerbated by the difficulties of liti-
gating in a distant forum. Alternatively, obtaining jurisdiction in the 
United States may serve purposes of convenience, but the choice of 
law will still be the same. For example, if the foreign jurisdiction’s 
law provides for reverse engineering, litigating in the United States 
will have no effect because no copyright rules will be violated, as the 
foreign jurisdiction’s laws allow the conduct. Applying a less restric-
tive foreign law in the United States obviously will not make the for-
eign law afford protections equivalent to U.S. law. Litigating in the 
United States, however, will likely provide a friendlier court to a do-
mestic party seeking enforcement of its copyright and seeking retri-
bution for infringements occurring abroad. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The territorial limitations of U.S. law place dangerous limitations 
on the application of copyright law to infringements occurring 
abroad. Certain tools currently exist to indirectly combat foreign 
copyright infringements. Nevertheless, these tools do not provide 
sufficient protections when the courts can exercise personal jurisdic-
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tion but cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the infring-
ing activity due to territorial limitations. Some courts have sought to 
expansively treat the “authorization” language of section 106 to en-
able a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over the infringement, 
even though the underlying direct infringement does not occur do-
mestically. Allowing a cause of action based on section 106’s “au-
thorization” language better serves to protect the United States’ in-
terests in its nationals’ intellectual property than does the current 
policy of the Ninth Circuit, which requires a finding of an underlying 
act of domestic infringement. As the Curb court remarked, “[i]n a 
global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a differ-
ence.”151 
Brandon Dalling 
 
 151. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). 
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